** Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Jennifer Gandhi |
| **Author** | Adam Przeworski |
| **Volume** | 40 |
| **Issue** | 11 |
| **Pages** | 1279-1301 |
| **Publication** | Comparative political studies |
| **Date** | 2007 |
| **Journal Abbr** | Comparative political studies |
| **Abstract** | Why do some autocrats survive for decades, and others fall soon after taking power? The authors argue that when authoritarian rulers need to solicit the cooperation of outsiders or deter the threat of rebellion, they rely on political institutions. Partisan legislatures incorporate potential opposition forces, giving them a stake in the ruler's survival. By broadening the basis of support for autocrats, these institutions lengthen their tenures. An analysis of all authoritarian rulers in power during the 1946-1996 period provides evidence of the effect of nominally democratic institutions on their political survival. |

** Autocracies and the Control of Societal Organizations**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Marie-Eve Reny |
| **URL** | <https://www.cambridge.org/core/article/autocracies-and-the-control-of-societal-organizations/38C6452DC084A6213C3A45835D8D444C> |
| **Pages** | 1-20 |
| **Publication** | Government and Opposition |
| **ISSN** | 0017-257X |
| **DOI** | [10.1017/gov.2019.7](http://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2019.7) |
| **Library Catalog** | Cambridge University Press |
| **Abstract** | Authoritarian regimes seek to prevent formal and informal organizations in society from engaging in mobilized dissent. What strategies do they use to do so, and what explains their choices? I posit that state actors in autocracies use four mechanisms to control societal organizations: repression, coercion, cooptation and containment. How they control these organizations depends on whether they think they might undermine political stability. Two factors inform that assessment. First is whether state actors think societal organizations’ interests are reconcilable with regime resilience. Second is whether groups are in national or international networks that are either cohesive or incohesive. While the irreconcilability of interests influences state actors’ perceptions of groups as subversive, network cohesion shapes organizations’ capacity for large-scale mobilization. |

**Tags:**

* Middle East
* China
* authoritarian regimes
* societal organizations

** Autocratic Survival Strategies: Does Oil Make a Difference?**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Phoebe W. Ishak |
| **URL** | <http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/peps.ahead-of-print/peps-2018-0043/peps-2018-0043.xml> |
| **Volume** | 0 |
| **Issue** | 0 |
| **Publication** | Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy |
| **ISSN** | 1554-8597 |
| **Date** | 2019-04-17 |
| **DOI** | [10.1515/peps-2018-0043](http://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2018-0043) |
| **Accessed** | 4/24/2019, 5:30:36 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | Crossref |
| **Abstract** | This paper examines the behavior of dictators when faced by an imminent threat of being overthrown in oil abundant countries. In the short run, the dictator’s survival strategies is argued to be confined to public spending and repression, whereas the choice of their levels is conditional upon the intensity of the mass threat (i.e. civil protest vs. mass violence) and the size of oil wealth. The empirical results indicate a possibility of mixing between spending and repression, and that oil wealth allows for differences in their employed levels in face of the same threat. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 88 countries from 1981 to 2006, I found that mass violence is handled through increasing both spending and repression, whereas civil protest is only met by repression. Furthermore, greater oil wealth is found to provide a wider fiscal space to relatively increase spending, but only at low and intermediate levels of mass threats. As the threats intensify, the effect of oil wealth dissipates and oil wealth dictatorships behave the same as their non-oil wealth counterparts. |

**Tags:**

* repression
* Autocratic Survival
* regime survival
* oil rent
* public spending

** Beyond patronage: Violent struggle, ruling party cohesion, and authoritarian durability**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Steven R Levitsky |
| **Author** | Lucan A Way |
| **Volume** | 10 |
| **Issue** | 4 |
| **Pages** | 869-889 |
| **Publication** | Perspectives on Politics |
| **ISSN** | 1537-5927 |
| **Date** | 2012 |
| **Journal Abbr** | Perspectives on Politics |
| **Abstract** | We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable. We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived. |

**Tags:**

* regime survival
* authoritarian durability

**Cameroon is melting down — and the United States couldn’t care less**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Newspaper Article |
| **Author** | Fred Muvunyi |
| **URL** | <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2018/11/01/cameroon-is-melting-down-and-the-united-states-couldnt-care-less/> |
| **Publication** | Washington Post |
| **Date** | 2018/11/01 |
| **Accessed** | 11/5/2018, 4:46:30 AM |
| **Language** | en |
| **Abstract** | Fred Muvunyi, a former chairman of the Rwanda Media Commission, is an editor at Deutsche Welle, Germany’s international broadcaster. An American missionary was shot dead on Tuesday in Cameroon during clashes between the separatists and government soldiers. Charles Wesco, 44, was traveling with his wife, son and a driver when they came under fire. More than 400 civilians have already died in the conflict between the country’s French-speaking majority and its English-speaking minority. But perhaps the tragic death of a Westerner — one who had devoted his life to helping Cameroon — will now prompt the United States and Europe to stop looking away. President Paul Biya, in power for 36 years, is set to be sworn in next week for another seven-year term after claiming victory Oct. 7 in elections marred by allegations of fraud. Despite ample evidence of vote tampering and insecurity on election day, Washington was quick to congratulate the people of Cameroon on what it called a “largely peaceful elections.” Cameroonians, who have long been yearning for peace, can hardly be blamed for regarding that statement as a mockery. Most of them, not only the English-speakers who are fighting desperately for independence, had hoped that Biya would leave the palace. Those hopes are now dashed. I spent voting day in Buea, the capital of the southwest Anglophone region. I didn’t see a single person voting after midday — apart from the governor, who showed with a bodyguard of heavily armed soldiers. Most of the locals stayed indoors for their safety. In this region, where people have taken up hunting guns to fight his regime, Biya shamelessly claimed he won the majority of votes. Villages around Buea are entirely deserted — people are living in the forests, from fear of the president’s soldiers. Some 500,000have been displaced by the fighting. I could hear gunfire before, during and after the election. More than a dozen people died in the Anglophone areas in the course of 24 hours. How could Washington give this farce a clean bill of health? After the voting had closed, African Union observers said the ballot went well — despite the fact they couldn’t send any of their team to the far North, where the Boko Haram insurgency is wreaking havoc, or in the English-speaking regions, where the secessionists are fighting the regime. The AU verdict was not entirely surprising, because it routinely approves flawed elections; the U.S. statement in support of Biya was, however, a disaster. If Biya, as expected, remains in office for the coming seven years, it is highly likely that the country will slide into a terrible civil war — one of which the world will take notice only when nobody is left to save. The worsening crisis is largely the result of the Biya regime’s refusal to address the grievances of the country’s English-speaking minority, who have long suffered from systematic discrimination. In silencing them, soldiers have killed about 4,000 Anglophone civilians, according to the Center for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa, a nongovernmental organization based in Buea. Decaying bodies lie scattered on the streets of the capital. Sources tell me that hospital mortuaries in the city of Bamenda in the northwest are full, no place left for fresh bodies. The sights triggered memories of my own experience of Rwanda’s genocide against the Tutsis in 1994. The comparison is more apt than it might seem at first sight. France, Biya’s leading supporter in the West, is repeating the same mistakes it committed in Rwanda. The killing of Anglophone Cameroonians is not only the problem that confronts the country. Corruption is also ubiquitous. Though I had valid documents to travel and work in Cameroon, I had to pay money to be allowed to pass through every police and military checkpoint. Even at the international airport in Douala, staffers there extort money from passengers. This is not fiction. It’s my personal experience. Bribes are common in many African countries, but Cameroon has reached another level. The anti-corruption organization Transparency International ranks Cameroon among the most corrupt nations in the world, having it tied for the 153rd spot out of 180 countries. Biya remains unconcerned. He has spent at least four and a half years in total on private trips in the 36 years he has been president, according to research conducted by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. He has made himself at home in Geneva’s five-star Intercontinental Hotel, spending an estimated $65 million on stays there since he came to power. Back home, most Cameroonians are struggling to make ends meet, and war-displaced women and children have no place to sleep. Meanwhile, critics are killed or locked away in maximum-security prisons; many others have gone in exile. It’s high time for the West to reconsider its relationship with Biya — or at least to hold him accountable for the atrocities committed under his rule. Cameroonians, both English and French speakers, should stand up for their country and remove the leaders who are tearing them apart. Thirty-six years of pain is too much to endure. And they have nothing left to lose. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon case

****

**Cameroon on Brink of Civil War as English Speakers Recount ‘Unbearable’ Horrors**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Newspaper Article |
| **Author** | Dionne Searcey |
| **URL** | <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/africa/cameroon-election-biya-ambazonia.html> |
| **Publication** | The New York Times |
| **ISSN** | 0362-4331 |
| **Date** | 2018-10-07T03:44:20.569Z |
| **Section** | World |
| **Accessed** | 10/7/2018, 6:24:29 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | NYTimes.com |
| **Language** | en-US |
| **Abstract** | A crackdown on separatists has emptied cities amid accounts of soldiers burning homes and shooting civilians. Despite the chaos, the country holds an election Sunday. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* Politics and Government
* Biya, Paul
* Civilian Casualties
* English Language
* Human Rights and Human Rights Violations
* War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity

****

**Cameroon Politics and Governance: Cameroon Environmental Study, History Evaluation, and First World War, Education, Corruption**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Akpam Mboma |
| **Place** | Scotts Valley, CA |
| **Publisher** | CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-5424-7511-2 |
| **Date** | January 10, 2017 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Cameroon Politics and Governance. During the last two decades, many countries in sub-Sahara Africa embraced centralization as a new management strategy to render local government, broadly understood, more democratic, accountable, and responsive to the pressing social and economic needs of their citizens. The urgency of these reforms could, in part, be explained in a global socioeconomic context defined by large scale and rapid urbanization with concomitant social, economic, and political problems. These problems find concrete outlet in housing shortages, widespread unemployment, increasing poverty, environmental and sanitation problems, and failing social services in urban milieus. The said problems have been amplified by inadequate and sometimes contradictory political and administrative responses to the worsening physical and social infrastructure that are woefully in short supply, and have therefore, failed to respond in any meaningful way to growing pressures of rapid urban population growth in Africa. A case of Cameroon |

** Cameroon: Dependence and Independence**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Mark W. Delancey |
| **Place** | Boulder, CO |
| **Publisher** | Westview Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-89158-882-5 |
| **Date** | September 25, 1989 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |

** Cameroon: France’s Dysfunctional Puppet System in Africa**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Janvier Tchouteu |
| **Author** | Janvier Chouteu-Chando |
| **Author** | Janvier T. Chando |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | TISI Books |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-5210-5760-5 |
| **Date** | April 12, 2017 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | As a German colony from 1884-1916, Kamerun was called "The African Pearl" for its human and material potential, and for its strategic position in Africa. The defeat of Germany in the First World War and the partition of the colony into British Cameroons and French Cameroun did not diminish the area's outsize role in the political and economic evolution of the continent. So, the quest by the land's civic nationalists to reunite the British-controlled and French-controlled territories and make Cameroon independent, raised concerns among the colonialists in Britain and France, who planned to retain the unchecked influence their countries were having in the former German colony.Cameroon became independent and partially reunited in 1961, but with the exclusion of its civic nationalists who were banned, their leaders killed, imprisoned or exiled, and the general population suppressed and cowed. Put in power in pseudo-independent Cameroon, to maintain a system guaranteed by the colonial pact France made Cameroon and other Francophone territories to sign before granting them independence in the 1960s, was France puppet Ahmadou Ahidjo. The system is still in place today, albeit under the second puppet leadership of Paul Biya who has been in power for 45 years (10years as Prime Minister and 35 years as President). Every passing year has exposed the system's unsustainability and absurdity as Cameroon declines and continues to lose its place as "The African Pearl" and the pace-setter in the Central African region.But not until the rise to prominence of the once-insignificant former Spanish colony of Equatorial Guinea, a country without the constraints of a Colonial Pact, that has somehow harnessed its new-found oil wealth to develop the land to the point where it is on the verge of becoming a first World Nation, has its Francophone neighbors, of which Cameroon is the largest, suddenly become astir from the doldrums. Today, the citizens of these former French colonies whose leaders are French puppets that have been squandering the resources of the land to satisfy their whims and the whims of their puppeteers, can no longer ignore the fact that the French-imposed system has nothing to offer.Can Cameroon's civic-nationalists, who are currently in disarray, whisk their country and the Central African region out of seven decades of decay through a new system that would stimulate development and guarantee the values of freedom, tolerance, equality and individual rights cherished by the rest of the civilized world? |

** CAMEROON: The Haunted Heart of Africa**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Janvier Tchouteu |
| **Author** | Janvier Chouteu-Chando |
| **Author** | Janvier T. Chando |
| **Publisher** | Independently published |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-5205-5755-7 |
| **Date** | February 9, 2017 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Cameroon is the only country in Africa where those who campaigned, fought and died for the country's freedom and independence from colonial rule have never made it to power, where the ideas and ideals of these union-nationalists are still being suppressed by the unpopular system the colonial master put in place in the country after defeating these civic-nationalists in a bloody war variously described as France's genocidal war in Africa. This retarding French-imposed system keeps the country trapped in poverty, corruption, underdevelopment, dictatorship, despondency, and cynicism, thereby making Cameroon the most mismanaged country in Africa, despite its material resources and the dynamism of its people.  Questions loom: What is the way forward in dismantling the anachronistic system managed in Cameroon by the puppets of France's political mafia in Africa called FrancAfrique, a political establishment of marionettes of foreign interests acting as looters and mercenaries in the country of their birth? Are we witnessing the last stage of the political establishment? Would incumbent Paul Biya's term of office that ends in 2018 be the end of this French-imposed system that the clear majority of Cameroonians loathe? Are the Cameroonian people prepared to do what it takes to stop Paul Biya from renewing his mandate or to prevent France from imposing another usurper on them?  This account answers these questions and provides unique insights into Cameroon that explain why the country is considered the microcosm of Africa.  Cameroon's political establishment is made up of people or their heirs who played no role whatsoever -- whether as moderates or as radicals -- in the cause for the reunification and independence of British Cameroons and French Cameroun. Which explains why they mismanaged the reunification project, so that the country is now in an armed conflict that risks degenerating into a civil war replete with the ingredients for a genocide. |

**Tags:**

* french domination
* dictatorship
* corruption
* Cameroon case

** Cameroon's Social Democratic Front: Its History and Prospects as an Opposition Political Party**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Milton Krieger |
| **Place** | Mankon, Bamenda |
| **Publisher** | Langaa RPCIG |
| **ISBN** | 978-9956-558-16-2 |
| **Date** | March 1, 2008 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Cameroon's Social Democratic Front (SDF) was among the watershed challenges c.1990 by sub-Saharan Africa's democratization forces against autocratic regimes, but it crested in 1992 and has subsided since. Yet the party survives, participates in the National Assembly, maintains a grass roots structure, and prepares for a presidential ballot in 2011 that will likely determine its fate. The author conducted research four times in Cameroon, 1989-1999, focusing on the SDF since 1991, and maintains party contacts to the present. The book assesses its history and its prospects, covering the SDF in Africa-wide as well as Cameroonian terms. "Krieger has given us the first, superbly researched, finely tuned analysis of the fortunes of a major contemporary African opposition party, Cameroon's Social Democratic Front (SDF)." - Victor Le Vine, Washington University, St. Louis, USA. "The book goes far beyond its title and puts in context a daylight re-emergence of political opposition in Cameroon. To say that this long overdue history of the SDF party is a prolegomena to understanding contemporary Cameroon social forces is not an overstatement." - Ambroise Kom, University of Yaounde I, Cameroon. "...a level-headed but provocative examination of the structure and workings of a major African country...the sobriety with which he evaluates institutions and leadership is commendable, yielding exceptional analysis that will stand the test of time." - Toyin Falola, Fellow of the Nigerian Academy of Letters and Fellow of the Historical Society of Nigeria. Milton Krieger started teaching and research about sub-Saharan Africa in 1970. Nine trips there include four research visits providing two years time in Cameroon, 1989-99. The second, 1991, coincided with 'villes mortes' and turned his primary scholarship to the Social Democratic Front. Access to party documents, officials, and rank and file members included visitor status at the 1995 and 1999 national conventions. Party contacts continue to the present. |

** Cameroon’s linguistic divide deepens to rift on questions of democracy, trust, national identity**

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| **Type** | Report |
| **Author** | Mircea Lazar |
| **URL** | <http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r7_dispatchno283_anglo_francophone_divisions_deepen_in_cameroon.pdf> |
| **Date** | 11 March 2019 |
| **Accessed** | 3/10/2019, 8:00:00 PM |
| **Institution** | Afrobarometer |
| **Report Type** | Dispatches |
| **Abstract** | After more than a half-century as a single nation with a dual colonial heritage and two official languages – French and English – Cameroon is in danger of coming apart. Protests against perceived discrimination and lack of inclusion began peacefully in the anglophone regions in October 2016 but have escalated into violent conflict with a harsh government response (Africa Times, 2018; Morse, 2017; Confédération Suisse, 2018). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has voiced grave concerns about reported extrajudicial killings by state armed forces as well as abductions and killings by armed anglophone secessionists (AfricaNews, 2018; Atabong, 2018). Nearly half a million Cameroonians are internally displaced, and at least 30,000 have fled to neighbouring Nigeria (Africa Times, 2018). The October 2018 presidential election, which extended the 36-year reign of President Paul Biya, was marred by violence, irregularities, and a boycott by most residents of the anglophone regions. An opposition leader was later jailed after his party staged demonstrations against the election result (France24, 2019; International Crisis Group, 2018). These tensions between the two major linguistic zones have taken a clear toll on the country’s unity. Anglophone and francophone Cameroonians, who have lived as friends and neighbours for decades, are deeply divided on fundamental questions of democracy and state legitimacy, an analysis of 2018 Afrobarometer survey data shows. Major divisions have emerged as many anglophone Cameroonians have abandoned their support for and belief in the durability of Cameroonian democracy, as well as their fundamental trust in the state. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon case
* Afrobarometer round 7

** Cameroon’s Paul Biya Gives a Master Class in Fake Democracy**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Magazine Article |
| **Author** | Jefcoate O'Donnell |
| **Author** | Robbie Gramer |
| **URL** | <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/22/cameroons-paul-biya-gives-a-master-class-in-fake-democracy/> |
| **Publication** | Foreign Policy |
| **Date** | October 22, 2018 |
| **Accessed** | 10/25/2018, 5:49:46 AM |
| **Language** | en |
| **Abstract** | One of the world’s most experienced autocrats has clinched another seven-year term by bending the rules of the game in his direction in ways both old and new. |
| **Date Added** | 10/25/2018, 5:49:46 AM |
| **Modified** | 10/25/2018, 5:55:50 AM |

**Tags:**

* autocracy survival
* Cameroon case
* Paul Biya

** Can’t Find Cameroon’s President? Try Geneva’s Intercontinental Hotel**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Newspaper Article |
| **Author** | Drew Hinshaw |
| **Author** | Joe Parkinson |
| **URL** | <https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-does-the-lion-sleep-tonight-genevas-intercontinental-hotel-1541368940> |
| **Publication** | Wall Street Journal |
| **ISSN** | 0099-9660 |
| **Date** | 2018-11-04T22:02:00.000Z |
| **Section** | Page One |
| **Accessed** | 11/5/2018, 4:26:38 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | www.wsj.com |
| **Language** | en-US |
| **Abstract** | Paul Biya, one of the world’s longest-serving rulers, takes sustained Swiss vacations as his country grapples with insurgencies, crises. |

** Civil Disobedience in Cameroon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Justice Mbu |
| **Place** | New York |
| **Publisher** | iUniverse, Inc. |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-595-35858-8 |
| **Date** | June 1, 2006 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | This Book, Civil Disobedience in Cameroon, written by Justice Aloysius Nelson Taku Mbu, reveals the effect of the cumulative events from 1961 to 1990, precipitated by the enlargement of the presidential powers without corresponding safeguards for the protection of freedom under Cameroons advanced democracy.He analyzed the high tide of unitarism, where poverty and inequality dominates to create a class for the poor and the rich by giving favors and encouraging blackmail, mismanagement, falsity, deception and manipulative electioneering. The majority culture further thought that they could freely assimilate and at the same time treat the other minority part as of no significant consequence because they are Lucifers in heaven. [les enemies dans la maison] The immediate result was a nonviolent civil disobedience which began in Bamenda. The Cameroonians of English expression hold dearly that [1] benevolent freedom is an essential element in the content of all democratic constitutions [2] it is incorporated as a contract between the citizens and the government to guarantee good governance and protection for their persons, property, liberty and happiness without let or hindrance; [3] freedom is both a blessing and birthright from God, and [4] on it fundamental human rights are planted, nurtured and blossom to bring dignity, love and peace profound to all and sundry. The government failed in its ploy for good governance, resorted to threats, intimidation, and force to oppress the people without the litmus test. Justice Mbu has been an eye witness to the events of this transformation in political, social and economic changes that make Cameroon never to be the same again. He is retired with his family and resides in Maryland USA. |

** Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Steven Levitsky |
| **Author** | Lucan A Way |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | Cambridge University Press |
| **ISBN** | 1-139-49148-2 |
| **Date** | 2010 |
| **Abstract** | Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized. |

**Tags:**

* Competitive Authoritarianism
* Hybrid Regimes
* post-Cold War

** Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Jennifer Gandhi |
| **Author** | Adam Przeworski |
| **Volume** | 18 |
| **Issue** | 1 |
| **Pages** | 1-26 |
| **Publication** | Economics & politics |
| **ISSN** | 0954-1985 |
| **Date** | 2006 |
| **Journal Abbr** | Economics & politics |
| **Abstract** | Dictatorships are not all the same: some are purely autocratic but many exhibit a full panoply of seemingly democratic institutions. To explain these differences, we develop a model in which dictators may need cooperation to generate rents and may face a threat of rebellion. Dictators have two instruments: they can make policy concessions or share rents. We conclude that when they need more cooperation dictators make more extensive policy concessions and share fewer rents. In turn, when the threat of rebellion is greater, they make larger concessions but also distribute more spoils. Assuming that policy concessions require an institutional setting of legislatures and parties, we test this prediction statistically for all dictatorships that existed between 1946 and 1996. |

** Democracy and Democratization in Cameroon: Living with the Dual Heritage**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Joseph Takougang |
| **Volume** | 208 |
| **Place** | Aldershot, England |
| **Publisher** | Ashgate |
| **Date** | 1998 |
| **Date Added** | 6/11/2019, 3:33:24 AM |
| **Modified** | 6/11/2019, 3:36:37 AM |

** Democracy for Breakfast. Unveiling Mirage Democracy in Contemporary Africa**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Tatah Mentan |
| **URL** | <http://books.google.com/books?id=Kt4WAgAAQBAJ> |
| **Place** | Bamenda, Cameroon |
| **Publisher** | Langaa RPCIG |
| **ISBN** | 978-9956-791-27-9 |
| **Date** | 2013 |
| **Abstract** | Democracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are of ultimate value only as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing process. Africans must therefore be allowed to apply their cultural and historical experiences and talents in working out a pattern of 'government of the people, by the people, and for the people' according to their own understanding and as their own peculiar circumstances demand. Those who do not want the vertical 'Western-Style Democracy' must be given a fair chance to demonstrate an alternative African horizontal democracy. Perhaps what they come up with might be of benefit to politics even in the West, provided that their radical system of horizontal democracy protects the life, liberty and property of citizens, and provided that the people want it. The question of externally imposed or market-driven multi-party or dual-party or non-party is a matter of modality and should not occupy the center stage in Africa. |

**Tags:**

* Africa
* democracy

** Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Daron Acemoglu |
| **Author** | James A. Robinson |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | Cambridge University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-139-44695-2 |
| **Date** | 2005 |
| **Abstract** | This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization. |

**Tags:**

* democracy
* Political stability
* Dictatorship
* elite

** Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Editor** | Andreas Schedler |
| **Place** | Boulder, CO |
| **Publisher** | Lynne Rienner Publishers |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-58826-440-4 |
| **Date** | 2006 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Today, electoral authoritarianism represents the most common form of political regime in the developing world and the one we know least about. Filling in the lacuna, this new book presents cutting-edge research on the internal dynamics of electoral authoritarian regimes. Each concise, jargon-free chapter addresses a specific empirical puzzle on the basis of careful cross-national comparison. The result is a systematic, clearly structured study of the interaction between rulers and opposition parties in the central arena of struggle under electoral authoritarianism, the electoral battlefield. |

**Tags:**

* electoral authoritarianism

** Environment and Identity Politics in Colonial Africa: Fulani Migrations and Land Conflict**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Emmanuel Mbah |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | Routledge |
| **ISBN** | 1-315-29415-X |
| **Date** | 2016 |
| **Abstract** | Economic, political, and ethnic favoritism are common themes in the historiography of colonial Africa. Land ownership and control, and the abilities of the respective landscapes to sustain Africa’s growing population amidst the throes of climate change, have created recurrent identity crises throughout Africa. The book’s chapters elevate the discussion on recurrent environmental issues, the problems of contested ownership of land, autochthonism as well as the interaction and blending of different cultures in a restricted geographical space. The study highlights a neglected aspect of the history of Fulani migrations in West Africa - the colonial extension of the Fulani into the Southern Cameroons (the Fulani as a group did not exist in the region prior to 1916). Therefore the introduction of the Fulani in the region, at a time when ethnic affinities and control over land had already crystallized, resulted in problems of a wider magnitude that have been carefully and meticulously addressed in this book. Environment and Identity Politics in Colonial Africa makes a major contribution to colonial African historiography. It will be of interest to students and scholars of Modern Africa, African Environmental History and Colonial History |

**Tags:**

* Environment
* Colonial Africa
* Fulani Migrations
* Identity Politics
* Land Conflict

** Explaining presidential approval: The significance of issue salience**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | George C Edwards III |
| **Author** | William Mitchell |
| **Author** | Reed Welch |
| **URL** | <http://www.georgecedwardsiii.com/uploads/2/9/1/2/29125359/explaining_presidential_approval_ajps__feb_1995.pdf> |
| **Volume** | 39 |
| **Issue** | 1 |
| **Pages** | 108-134 |
| **Publication** | American Journal of Political Science |
| **Date** | 1995 |
| **Journal Abbr** | American Journal of Political Science |
| **Abstract** | Theory: For an issue to have a significant influence on evaluations of the president, it must be salient to people and people must evaluate the president in terms of his performance regarding it. Hypotheses: Issues vary in salience to the public over time; evaluations of the president's performance on issues vary in their impact on presidential approval over time; and evaluations of the president's performance on issues have more impact on presidential approval when the issues are salient to the public. Methods: Content analysis of media coverage of issues; cross-sectional multi-chotomous logit-regression analysis of 25 national public opinion polls; and time-series regression analysis of the relationship between issue salience and their impact on presidential approval. Results: Issues vary over time in their salience to the public and in their impact on presidential approval; and the salience of issues to the public directly affects their impact on the public's evaluation of the president. |

** Imperialistic Politics in Cameroun: Resistance & the Inception of the Restoration of the Statehood of Southern Cameroons**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Carlson Anyangwe |
| **Place** | Bamenda, Cameroon |
| **Publisher** | Langaa RPCIG |
| **ISBN** | 978-9956-558-50-6 |
| **Date** | August 1, 2008 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | It always comes as a surprise to many that the British-administered UN Trust Territory of the Southern Cameroons was not granted independence like other colonial territories but was allowed to fall prey to the territorial expansionism of the contiguous state of Cameroun Republic, a former French-administered UN Trust Territory granted independence on 1 January 1960. This book focuses on the unresolved Southern Cameroons colonial predicament, giving insightful accounts of how Cameroun Republic hijacked the Southern Cameroons and is holding its citizens under colonial bondage. The insights include details of the stratagems resorted to by Cameroun Republic to exact submission to its annexation of the Southern Cameroons and to conceal this crime from outside censure. These attempts have met and continue to meet with stiff resistance by the people of the Southern Cameroons. The book is a contribution to the loud and intense conversation on the inevitability of the restoration of the stolen statehood of the former British Southern Cameroons, the restitution of its occupied territory and the reassertion of the dignity and humanity of its people. |

** Inside the Virtual Ambazonia: Separatism, Hate Speech, Disinformation and Diaspora in the Cameroonian Anglophone Crisis**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Thesis |
| **Author** | Sombaye Eyango Jules Roger |
| **URL** | <https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/1158> |
| **Place** | San Francisco, CA |
| **Date** | 2018 |
| **Accessed** | 3/14/2019, 8:00:00 PM |
| **Type** | MA Thesis |
| **University** | University of San Francisco |
| **Abstract** | This study examines the dynamics of the Anglophone separatist claims in Cameroon, the so called “Anglophone Crisis”. I focus on explaining why the separatist claims reemerged in 2016 after being shut down for about 20 years. It explains how the Anglophone separatist revendications have sustained over time despite the extremely centralized power of the Paul Biya government. This paper first argues that the Anglophone crisis is more than an identity struggle between Anglophone/Francophone Cameroonians, but rather a conflict about historical and institutional grievances, political competition, and regional politics involving the neighboring state of Nigeria. Second, it verifies the hypothesis that the sustainability of the Anglophone separatist claims relies on the important support of Cameroonians from the diaspora with the contribution of social media. According to this hypothesis, over the years, this diaspora has contributed to strengthen the Anglophone identity and to maintain a mobilization of Anglophone Cameroonians on the ground around the idea of an independent republic, the republic of Ambazonia. This mobilization has been mainly led through the internet space, especially on social media. Finally, I explain the dynamics of the online mobilization of the separatist Anglophone movements. I argue that this mobilization is achieved through the spreading of hate speech and disinformation on social media platform such as Facebook. I also argue that despite this important virtual mobilization, the Anglophone separatist movements reemerged as unstructured entities, composed of multiple armed groups that don’t necessarily cooperate. Indeed, despite the apparent consensual mobilization around an independent republic of Ambazonia, it is still hard to perceive any homogeneity in the political and military structure of this separatist movement. This fragmentation among the Anglophone people make the political negotiation with the Cameroonian government more difficult to achieve. In addition, I analyze the perception of this mobilization by international media, by doing a content analysis of the coverage BBC and Jeune Afrique. Existing literature on secession in Africa analyzes secession as identity, religious or ethnic struggles. My study aims to analyze the Anglophone crisis with a different approach which considers the role of the diaspora and the mobilization on internet. It also captures the regional dynamic of the conflict involving the key role of Nigeria. My research suggests that secession must be examined differently than the way it has been studied by previous scholars. Indeed, previous studies focused on the local and national dynamic of this phenomena, limiting it to the borders of states. My study challenges this approach by showing secession as a struggle that transcends borders, by considering the diasporas and the internet as important actors in the struggle. I suggest embedding separatist movements in the globalized and digitized world in which we live today. In the final chapter, my study also explores potential measures that have to be taken to handle the crisis. First, it suggests a strengthening of the decentralization guaranteed by the Cameroonian constitution. Second, it encourages the humanitarian cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria to keep the stability of their common border. Finally, it explains that the Anglophone crisis should also raise the awareness of the international community about the issue of disinformation and propaganda on the internet during conflict, which is one of our modern day’s challenge. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* Ambazonia
* Anglophone crisis
* diaspora

** Les camerounais n'approuvent pas la politique économique de leur gouvernement mais font confiance à la Police, à l'Armée et au Président de la République**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Report |
| **Author** | Afrobarometer |
| **URL** | <http://afrobarometer.org/press/les-camerounais-napprouvent-pas-la-politique-economique-de-leur-gouvernement-mais-font> |
| **Place** | Yaoundé, Cameroon |
| **Date** | 2015 |
| **Accessed** | 6/12/2019, 2:08:25 PM |
| **Institution** | Afrobarometer |
| **Report Type** | Communiqué de presse |
| **Abstract** | Les camerounais n'approuvent pas la politique économique de leur gouvernement. Ils critiquent cette politique dans les domaines ci-après: les inégalités, l'énergie, l'eau, création des emplois, l'insécurité alimentaire, la corruption et les infrastructures. Par contre, ils approuvent les efforts de leur gouvernement dans les secteurs de la santé, de l'éducation et l'insécurité. Ils pensent que le Président de la République a bien exécuté son mandat en 2014 et font confiance en l'Armée, à la Police, aux Chefs Religieux, aux Chefs Traditionnels et au Président de la République. Par contre, ils ne font pas confiance aux partis politiques, aux tribunaux, aux Communes, à la Directions Générale des Impôts, au Parlement et à ELECAM. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* imporance of trust

** Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence: Nationalism, Grassfields Tradition, and State Building in Cameroon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Meredith Terretta |
| **Edition** | 1 edition |
| **Place** | Athens, Ohio |
| **Publisher** | Ohio University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-8214-2069-0 |
| **Date** | November 15, 2013 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | “In following the paths of Cameroonian nationalists where they actually lead, Meredith Terretta’s study does a number of things that no previously published histories of Cameroon’s decolonization have done. ” —African Studies Quarterly  Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence is the first extensive history of Cameroonian nationalism to consider the global and local influences that shaped the movement within the French and British Cameroons and beyond. Drawing on the archives of the United Nations, France, Great Britain, Ghana, and Cameroon, as well as oral sources, Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence chronicles the spread of the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) nationalist movement from the late 1940s into the first postcolonial decade. It shows how, in the French and British Cameroon territories administered as UN Trusteeships after the Second World War, notions of international human rights, the promise of Third World independence, Pan-African federation, and national citizenship blended with local political and spiritual practices that resurfaced as the period of European rule came to a close. After French and British administrators banned the party in the mid-1950s, UPC nationalists adopted violence as a revolutionary strategy. In the 1960s, the nationalist vision disintegrated. The postcolonial regime labeled UPC nationalists “outlaws” and rounded them up for imprisonment or execution as the state shifted to single-party rule in 1966.Nation of Outlaws, State of Violence traces the connection between local and transregional politics in the age of Africa’s decolonization and the early decades of the Cold War. Rather than stop at official independence as most conventional histories of African nationalist movements do, this book considers postindependence events as crucial to the history of Cameroonian nationalism and to an understanding of the postcolonial government that came to power on 1 January 1960. While the history of the UPC is a story that ends with the party’s failure to gain access to political power with independence, it is also a story of the postcolonial state’s failure to become a nation. |

**Tags:**

* Must read
* Conflict Escalation
* political violence
* Cameroon case

** Negotiating an Anglophone identity: A study of the politics of recognition and representation in Cameroon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Piet Konings |
| **Author** | Francis Beng Nyamnjoh |
| **Place** | Leiden and Boston |
| **Publisher** | Brill |
| **ISBN** | 90-04-13295-3 |
| **Date** | 2003 |
| **Abstract** | This is a significant and timely book on the politics of belonging. It captures, with fascinating detail and insight, the current widespread disaffection with the sterile rhetoric of nation-building that has characterised much of postcolonial African politics. Until the liberation struggles of the 1990s, dictatorship only paid lip service to democracy with impunity, often by silencing those perceived to threaten national unity. Since then, individuals and groups have reactivated claims to rights and entitlements and nowhere more so than in Cameroon. The book articulates the experiences and predicaments of the country's Anglophone community trapped in a marriage of inconvenience pregnant with tensions and conflicts. |

** No Spring in Africa: How Sub-Saharan Africa Has Avoided the Arab Spring Phenomenon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Osman Antwi-Boateng |
| **URL** | <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/polp.12129> |
| **Volume** | 43 |
| **Issue** | 5 |
| **Pages** | 754-784 |
| **Publication** | Politics & Policy |
| **ISSN** | 1747-1346 |
| **Date** | 2015 |
| **DOI** | [10.1111/polp.12129](http://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12129) |
| **Abstract** | This article explores in detail the conditions underpinning why Sub-Saharan Africa has avoided the Arab Spring phenomenon—despite the existence of extremely fertile grounds for political revolutions. Using a historical comparative method, the study draws chiefly from three Arab Spring countries (Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya), and identifies the key factors that aided the domino-effect of political revolutions in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. It then contrasts these with the domino-inhibiting factors drawn from an examination of four Sub-Saharan African countries: Chad, Sudan, Cameroon, and Angola. The central argument emphasizes contextual regional uniqueness. While a set of factors unique to the MENA region aided a revolution domino effect, a combination of structural, domestic, and external factors equally unique to Sub-Saharan Africa have enabled the latter to evade the domino effect of the Arab Spring. Related Articles Este artículo explora en detalle las condiciones fundamentales que explican por qué Áfirca subsahariana a evitado el fenómeno de la primavera árabe—a pesar de la existencia de condiciones favorables para revoluciones políticas. Usando un método histórico comparativo, este estudio se basa en tres países que experimentaron la primavera árabe (Túnez, Egipto, y Libia), e identifica los factores clave que facilitaron el efecto domino en las revoluciones políticas de la región del Medio Oriente y Norte de África (MONA). Posteriormente éstos se contrastan con los factores inhibidores de un efecto domino observados en tres países subsaharianos: Chad, Sudan, y Camerún. El argumento central de este trabajo hace énfasis en la importancia particular de cada contexto regional. Mientras que un conjunto de factores únicos a la región MONA promovieron a un efecto dominó en la revolución, una combinación de factores estructurales, domésticos y externos también únicos a la región subsahariana le han permitido a ésta última evadir el efecto dominó de la primavera árabe. |

**Tags:**

* tunisia
* Sub-Saharan Africa
* Egypt
* Arab Spring
* sudan
* social movements
* Democracy and Democratization
* Angola
* Cameroon
* Libya
* Cameroun
* Chad
* Comparative International Politics
* Domino Effect
* Maghreb
* MENA region
* Political Revolutions
* Protest Cascades
* Spread

** Oil and political survival**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Jørgen Juel Andersen |
| **Author** | Silje Aslaksen |
| **URL** | <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387812000727> |
| **Volume** | 100 |
| **Issue** | 1 |
| **Pages** | 89-106 |
| **Publication** | Journal of Development Economics |
| **ISSN** | 0304-3878 |
| **Date** | January 1, 2013 |
| **Journal Abbr** | Journal of Development Economics |
| **DOI** | [10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.008](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2012.08.008) |
| **Abstract** | Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects. |

**Tags:**

* Natural resources
* Institutions
* Oil
* Political survival

** Paul Biya of Cameroon: Three-Plus Decades of Misrule Under an Anachronistic French-Imposed System**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Janvier Tchouteu |
| **Author** | Janvier Chouteu-Chando |
| **Author** | Janvier T. Chando |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | TISI Books |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-72009-551-4 |
| **Date** | September 13, 2018 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Paul Biya, the octogenarian second president of Cameroon has been power for forty-six years (ten years as prime minister, which is the second highest office of the land, and thirty-six years as the President ---the highest office of the land), making him Africa's and the world's longest-serving head of state who is a non-royal. He is the caretaker of a six-decade-old system put in place by France before it allowed Cameroon to become a member of the UnitedNations Organization on January 01, 1960 by granting it its so-called independence, a system made up of a Cameroonian political establishment of French lackeys and their French overlords that effectively operates like a mafia to safeguard France's lopsided dealings and interest in Cameroon and the rest of Francophone Africa.The French-backed political mafia that Paul Biya is presiding over has created the most efficient election-rigging machinery in the world and the most undemocratic pluralistic country on earth with close to three hundred political parties, ninety-nine plus percent of which are appendages of the system. The system created these pseudo-parties with the purpose of validating his electoral charades that are always backed by the foreign powers whose interest he is serving.In this pseudo-democracy where less than 10% of the voting population gets to participate in elections, where Paul Biya does not even bother to campaign, and where political lethargy and political apathy runs high, a culture of deception is mushrooming that would soon snuff out what is left of the progressive Cameroonian values that made the country prominent in the last century.In this account, Janvier Tchouteu takes the reader hand-in-hand in the journey for an insight into the shackled heart of Africa and the rule of an octogenarian who hates the people of the country he has been misruling to serve the interests of his puppet masters. |

** Perceived patronage: Do secret societies, ethnicity, region boost careers in Cameroon?**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Report |
| **Author** | Thomas Isbell |
| **URL** | <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/ad162-perceived-patronage-do-secret-societies-ethnicity-region-boost-careers-cameroon> |
| **Date** | 2017 |
| **Accessed** | 6/12/2019, 2:01:23 PM |
| **Institution** | Afrobarometer |
| **Report Type** | Dispatches |
| **Abstract** | An effective and transparent administration forms the backbone of a well-run democratic state and market economy in the developing world (Grindle & Hilderbrand, 1995.) Recruitment of public-sector staff based on merit plays an important role in ensuring not only that the machine functions smoothly but also that ordinary citizens have confidence in how their country is governed. Patronage or favouritism can undermine both functioning and public confidence (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002; Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In Cameroon, many critics of the government have long argued that factors other than merit help determine who holds government positions and gets promotions (Ayukogem, 2014; Nsom, 2012). Leaders have been accused of giving preferential treatment to particular regions and ethnic groups as well as to fellow members of secret societies – from fraternal groups such as the Ekpe to the Rosicrucian Order AMORC and the Freemasons to religious groups such as Eckankar and the Illuminati (Ayukogem, 2014; Nsom, 2012). Do ordinary Cameroonians believe that such factors play an important role in public-sector careers? Based on data from Afrobarometer’s Round 6 (2015) survey, substantial proportions of the population do. Moreover, citizens who see such favouritism at work in career advancement are less likely to hold positive views of Cameroon’s democracy. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* importance of secret society

** Political Economy of Dictatorship**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Ronald Wintrobe |
| **Place** | Cambridge, U.K. |
| **Publisher** | Cambridge University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-521-79449-7 |
| **Date** | 2000 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Although much of the world still lives today, as always, under dictatorship, the behavior of these regimes and of their leaders often appears irrational and mysterious. This book uses rational choice theory to understand dictators: How do "successful" dictatorships stay in power? What determines the repressiveness of a regime? How do their economies work? The book contains many applications, including chapters on Nazi Germany, Soviet Communism, South Africa under apartheid, and Pinochet's Chile. It also provides a guide to the policies that should be followed by the democracies towards dictatorships. |

**Tags:**

* survival of autocrats
* autocratic repression
* economics of autocratic regime

** Political Institutions under Dictatorship**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Jennifer Gandhi |
| **Place** | New York, New York |
| **Publisher** | Cambridge University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-521-15571-7 |
| **Date** | 2008 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Often dismissed as window-dressing, nominally democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, play an important role in non-democratic regimes. In a comprehensive cross-national study of all non-democratic states from 1946 to 2002 that examines the political uses of these institutions by dictators, Gandhi finds that legislative and partisan institutions are an important component in the operation and survival of authoritarian regimes. She examines how and why these institutions are useful to dictatorships in maintaining power, analyzing the way dictators utilize institutions as a forum in which to organize political concessions to potential opposition in an effort to neutralize threats to their power and to solicit cooperation from groups outside of the ruling elite. The use of legislatures and parties to co-opt opposition results in significant institutional effects on policies and outcomes under dictatorship. |

** Post-Colonial Cameroon: Politics, Economy, and Society**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Editor** | Joseph Takougang |
| **Editor** | Julius A. Amin |
| **Author** | John M. Mbaku |
| **Author** | Fonkem Achankeng I |
| **Author** | Peter Ngwafu |
| **Author** | Walter Gam Nkwi |
| **Author** | Roland N. Ndille |
| **Author** | Honoré Mimche |
| **Author** | Christian Bios Nelem |
| **Author** | Achille Pinghane Yonta |
| **Author** | Nobert Lengha Tohnain |
| **Author** | Carlson Anyangwe |
| **Author** | Moses K. Tesi |
| **Author** | Lotsmart Fonjong |
| **Author** | Kengo Emmanuel |
| **Author** | Zacharia N. Nchinda |
| **Author** | Jeannette Wogaing |
| **Author** | Mireille Nnanga |
| **Author** | Rose Angeline Abissi |
| **Author** | Augustine E. Ayuk |
| **Author** | Emmanuel E. Kengo |
| **Author** | Rose Mireille Nnanga |
| **Place** | Lanham, MD |
| **Publisher** | Lexington Books |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-4985-6463-2 |
| **Date** | June 13, 2018 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | In this unique volume, leading scholars examine how Cameroonians organize and experience their lives under Cameroonian leadership and local responses to that leadership. The volume offers essential case studies that allow us to examine the lives of ordinary people in post-colonial Africa through five lenses: politics, society and culture, economy, international relations, and migration. It places the nation’s contemporary challenges within a broader political, economic, and socio-cultural context, and uses that to make recommendations for future directions. The book also celebrates areas in which the country has done well and calls on its citizens to build on those achievements. This volume is forward-looking and as such raises important questions about issues of development, ethnicity, wealth, poverty, and class. |

**Tags:**

* political stability
* Cameroon case

** Presidential Approval**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | George C. Edwards III |
| **Place** | Baltimore, MD |
| **Publisher** | Johns Hopkins University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-8018-4015-9 |
| **Date** | 1991 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | An overview of the use measurement and use of the presidential approval. |

** Reconstructing the Authoritarian State in Africa**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Editor** | Jr., George K. Kieh |
| **Editor** | Pita O. Agbese |
| **URL** | <http://books.google.com/books?id=wQMiAQAAQBAJ> |
| **Place** | New York, NY |
| **Publisher** | Routledge |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-135-00759-1 |
| **Date** | 2013 |
| **Abstract** | This work seeks to examine the nature and dynamics of authoritarianism in Africa and to suggest ways in which the states covered in the book can be democratically reconstituted. In 1990, a wave of euphoria greeted the "third wave of democratization" that swept across the African Continent. The repression-wearied subalterns were hopeful that the "third wave" would have set into motion the process of democratically reconstituting the authoritarian state on the continent. More than two decades thereafter, although some progress has been made, by and large, the authoritarian state remains the dominant construct in the region. Even in some of the countries in which democratic transitions have taken place, the process of democratic consolidation remains an elusive quest as these states are sandwiched between authoritarianism and democracy. Against this background, the purpose of this book is to examine the travails of the authoritarian state in Africa, including the Herculean task to democratically reconstruct it. In order to do this, six of Africa’s perennial authoritarian states—Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Liberia, Rwanda and Uganda—are used as the case studies. The book has two major objectives. First, the various chapters probe the nature and dynamics of authoritarianism in Africa. Second, the chapters suggest ways in which the various authoritarian states covered in the book can be democratically reconstituted. |

**Tags:**

* Africa
* authoritarian state

** Repression is worsening in Cameroon amid an uprising over language**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Magazine Article |
| **Author** | The Economist |
| **URL** | <https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/06/02/repression-is-worsening-in-cameroon-amid-an-uprising-over-language> |
| **Publication** | The Economist |
| **ISSN** | 0013-0613 |
| **Date** | 2018-05-31 |
| **Accessed** | 6/4/2018, 4:48:59 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | The Economist |
| **Abstract** | The president shows little interest in finding a peaceful solution to the crisis |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon case

**Attachments**

* The Economist - 2018 - Repression is worsening in Cameroon amid an uprisi.pdf

** Secessionism in African Politics: Aspiration, Grievance, Performance, Disenchantment**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Editor** | Lotje de Vries |
| **Editor** | Pierre Englebert |
| **Editor** | Mareike Schomerus |
| **URL** | <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7> |
| **Place** | Cham |
| **Publisher** | Springer International Publishing |
| **ISBN** | 978-3-319-90205-0 978-3-319-90206-7 |
| **Date** | 2019 |
| **Extra** | DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-90206-7 |
| **Accessed** | 8/25/2018, 4:48:25 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | Crossref |
| **Language** | en |
| **Abstract** | Secessionism perseveres as a complex political phenomenon in Africa, yet often a more in-depth analysis is overshadowed by the aspirational simplicity of pursuing a new state. Using historical and contemporary approaches, this edited volume offers the most exhaustive collection of empirical studies of African secessionism to date. The respected expert contributors put salient and lesser known cases into comparative perspective, covering Biafra, Katanga, Eritrea and South Sudan alongside Barotseland, Cabinda, and the Comoros, among others. Suggesting that African secessionism can be understood through the categories of aspiration, grievance, performance, and disenchantment, the book's analytical framework promises to be a building block for future studies of the topic. |

**Tags:**

* Africa
* secessionism

** The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Bouopda P Kamé |
| **Place** | Paris, France |
| **Publisher** | L'Harmattan |
| **Date** | 2018 |
| **Abstract** | On the eve of the lifting of the trusteeship of the United Nations, Cameroon is a country, two territories, and two legacies from the French and British administrations since 1916. More than forty years of administration necessarily leaves an imprint of the language and specifi c socio-political mores on populations established in two distinct territories that the author identifi es as Francophone Cameroon and Anglophone Cameroon. The anglophone crisis is the political crisis in Anglophone Cameroon, which represents the fi fth of the territory and population of the state of Cameroon. After establishing this reality, the book addresses the subject of the institutionalization of these two historical legacies. This state issue is at the heart of the political crisis that has repeatedly affected Anglophone Cameroon for decades, and has degenerated into an armed confl ict since the end of 2017. The author shows with great clarity how the transition from the federal form of the state to its unitary form was accompanied by a progressive deinstitutionalization of the Anglophone socio-political heritage with the loss of important prerogatives devolved historically to Anglophone Cameroon. The profound origin of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon would thus be in the opportunistic refusal of the institutional expurgation of this historical legacy. This reading helps to understand the requirements to return to federalism, which is expressed now in both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroon. The book also clearly shows the progress of the current phase of the crisis since its beginning in October 2016. Whether in the form or the substance of the claims originally expressed by lawyers and Teachers of Anglophone Cameroon, or the alternation of cooperative and repressive strategies of the Cameroonian leadership, the reading of this book is particularly instructive. |

** The End of French Rule in Cameroon**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Rowman Littlefield |
| **Place** | Lanham, MD |
| **Publisher** | University Press Of America |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-7618-5278-0 |
| **Date** | September 28, 2010 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | The End of French Rule in Cameroon is a study of the decolonization movement in Cameroon. It analyzes the reforms introduced by France in Cameroon after World War II, the circumstances surrounding the unsuccessful attempt of the U.P.C. to seize independence by force, and the subsequent eradication of this party by an alliance of Franco-Cameroonian forces. The book shows the length that the French were prepared to go in order to leave Cameroon in the hands of a government that would be sympathetic to their interests. The research is based upon documents found in Cameroon, France, and the United States. It will expand the existing limited literature in English on the historiography of Cameroon and will also be useful for instructors teaching courses related to modern and contemporary Africa in general and decolonization in (French) black Africa in particular, as well as all interested in these subjects. |
| **# of Pages** | 162 |

** The Intestines of the State: Youth, Violence, and Belated Histories in the Cameroon Grassfields**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Nicolas Argenti |
| **Place** | Chicago, IL |
| **Publisher** | University of Chicago Press |
| **Date** | 2008 |
| **Abstract** | The young people of the Cameroon Grassfields have been subject to a long history of violence and political marginalization. For centuries the main victims of the slave trade, they became prime targets for forced labor campaigns under a series of colonial rulers. Today’s youth remain at the bottom of the fiercely hierarchical and polarized societies of the Grassfields, and it is their response to centuries of exploitation that Nicolas Argenti takes up in this absorbing and original book. Beginning his study with a political analysis of youth in the Grassfields from the eighteenth century to the present, Argenti pays special attention to the repeated violent revolts staged by young victims of political oppression. He then combines this history with extensive ethnographic fieldwork in the Oku chiefdom, discovering that the specter of past violence lives on in the masked dance performances that have earned intense devotion from today’s youth. Argenti contends that by evoking the imagery of past cataclysmic events, these masquerades allow young Oku men and women to address the inequities they face in their relations with elders and state authorities today. |

** The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Editor** | John Mukum Mbaku |
| **Editor** | Joseph Takougang |
| **Place** | Trenton, NJ |
| **Publisher** | Africa World Pr |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-59221-179-1 |
| **Date** | December 1, 2003 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | This book is written by an outstanding group of scholars, all of whom have a genuine and longstanding interest in peace and social justice in Cameroon. It makes a significant contribution to the debate on poverty alleviation in Cameroon, the country's stalled transition to democratic governance, identity and citizenship and the equitable allocation of resources. The Leadership Challenge in Africa contains the refreshing, rigorous, and informative analysis of the Biya regime, opposition politics, as well as the Anglophone problem and provides practical strategies to enhance peaceful co-existence and sustainable development in the country. It emphasizes the importance of enfranchising the Camroonian people and providing them with the facilities to determine how they want to be governed and how their resources should be allocated. Contributing scholars include Lyombe Eko, Julius Amin, Piet Konings, Francis B. Nyamnjob, Samgena D. Galega, Martha Tumnde, Nicodemus Fur Awasom, Nantang Jua, Fuabeh P. Fonge, Charels Manga Fombad, Victor Julius Ngoh, Charles Manga Fombad, Jonie Banyong Fonyam, and Greg Asuagbor. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* politics of division
* Biya regime

** The Logic of Political Survival**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Bruce Bueno de Mesquita |
| **Author** | Alastair Smith |
| **Author** | Randolph M. Siverson |
| **Author** | James D. Morrow |
| **URL** | <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001> |
| **Place** | Boston, MA |
| **Publisher** | The MIT Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-0-262-26952-0 |
| **Date** | August 28, 2003 |
| **Extra** | DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 |
| **Accessed** | 4/13/2019, 8:00:00 PM |
| **Abstract** | The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically. |

** The political regimes of Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya, and Christian Tumi, Priest**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Manfred Gabriel Njoh |
| **Place** | Douala, Cameroon |
| **Publisher** | Christian Cardinal TUMI |
| **Date** | 2006 |
| **Abstract** | This book, which is only part of what we could have called “the Memories of Cardinal Tumi”, enables the reader to know the author from an angle other than that held by public opinion. He is, first and foremost, a Christian and a pastor who, even while speaking of those who recklessly tried to tarnish his image, has the decency and deep respect characteristic of those who are patient and who think before acting... The author's passion for the truth and sense of objectivity do not sometimes hide his anger in the face of certain unfounded déclarations. Such passions do not take into account what has been said, but rather linger on the person who says what they have to say. It is easy to understand the stand taken by some government officials, which mostly exposed their authors more than they did the person whom they attempted to smear publicly... “The bishop, priest and citizen,” a privileged witness of his generation, has given future generations another view of the history of our country through its leaders |

** The Politics of Authoritarian Rule**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Milan W. Svolik |
| **Place** | Cambridge, UK |
| **Publisher** | Cambridge University Press |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-107-60745-3 |
| **Date** | September 17, 2012 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. First, dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - this is the problem of authoritarian control. A second, separate challenge arises from the elites with whom dictators rule - this is the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Crucially, whether and how dictators resolve these two problems is shaped by the dismal environment in which authoritarian politics takes place: in a dictatorship, no independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflict. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators, such as Saddam Hussein, establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why leadership changes elsewhere are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. When assessing his arguments, Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis of comprehensive, original data on institutions, leaders, and ruling coalitions across all dictatorships from 1946 to 2008. |

**Tags:**

* autocratic regime

** The Revolution Conundrum in Cameroon: A study of Relative Peace Under President Biya's Rule**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Thesis |
| **Author** | Marianna Babboni |
| **URL** | <https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3856&context=isp_collection> |
| **Place** | Los Angeles, CA |
| **Date** | 2018 |
| **Accessed** | 9/18/2018, 8:00:00 PM |
| **Type** | BA Thesis |
| **University** | Occidental College |
| **Abstract** | This paper attempts to answer the question: What are the factors that have contributed to relative peace in Cameroon under the rule of President Paul Biya up until the civil uprisings in the Anglophone regions in 2016? Cameroon has witnessed consistent civil unrest in the forms of protests and strikes and yet the political structure remains strong against all opposition. Within the limitations of the research, the study finds three main explanations: state terror tactics and divide and rule strategies have quelled opposition, the survival culture of the population has resulted in creative economic alternatives that subsidize civil disorder, and the cultural legacies of two colonial powers, the British and the French, influence different citizenship understandings and relationships to defiance. However, although the political situation has remained intact, the country is not unified in the slightest, and the effects of years of corruption, fraudulent elections, and consistent marginalization of Anglophones is taking its toll. The stability of the Biya regime is currently being put to the test in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions. Although the relative peace of the nation is being questioned with this rising Anglophone civil war, this study foresees that the aforementioned factors that have prevented disintegration before will likely prevent a revolution from succeeding once again. |

**Tags:**

* factors of stability
* Cameroon case
* persistent political stability
* relative peace

****

** The Roots of Stability and Instability in Cameroon**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book Section |
| **Author** | Augustine E Ayuk |
| **Editor** | Joseph Takougang |
| **Editor** | Julius A. Amin |
| **Place** | Lahman, MD |
| **Publisher** | Lexington Books |
| **Pages** | 43-64 |
| **Date** | 2018 |
| **Abstract** | Current research on political stability and instability attempts to explain the underlying causes of political unrest in polities, with the goals of predicting where far-reaching changes are likely to occur and of making policy recommendations that regimes could undertake in order to retain control of power (Goldsmith 1987). The political disposition in postindependence Cameroon was characterized by a strong ruling party, the Cameroon National Union (CNU), and a strong individual, President Ahmadou Ahidjo. |
| **Book Title** | Post-Colonial Cameroon: Politics, Economy, and Society |

** Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Juan J. Linz |
| **Place** | Boulder, CO |
| **Publisher** | Lynne Rienner Publishers |
| **ISBN** | 978-1-55587-890-0 |
| **Date** | 2000 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | In this classic work, noted political sociologist Juan Linz provides an unparalleled study of the nature of nondemocratic regimes. Linz's seminal analysis develops the fundamental distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian systems. It also presents a pathbreaking discussion of the personalistic, lawless, nonideological type of authoritarian rule that he calls (following Weber) the "sultanistic regime." The core of the book (including a 40-page bibliography) was published in 1975 as a chapter in the Handbook of Political Science, long out of print. The author has chosen not to change the original text for this new edition, but instead has added an extensive introduction reflecting on some of the contributions to the literature and the changes that have taken place in world politics and in the nature of regimes since the 1970s. |

** Understanding Confusion in Africa: The Politics of Multiculturalism and Nation-building in Cameroon**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Book |
| **Author** | Peter Ateh-Afac Fossungu |
| **Place** | Bamenda, Cameroon |
| **Publisher** | Langaa RPCIG |
| **ISBN** | 978-9956-728-53-4 |
| **Date** | February 17, 2013 |
| **Library Catalog** | Amazon |
| **Language** | English |
| **Abstract** | Cameroon is often considered to be Africa's legendary pathfinder. This book argues essentially that Cameroon cannot competently champion African unity and progress until it can correctly pursue its own multicultural nation-building. Cameroon's success continental-wise would depend on its theory and practice of multiculturalism, as particularly reflected in (1) the rejoicing in its historical diversity and the harmonious co-existence of its Systems of Education which must, of necessity, be linked to (2) effective federalization or decentralization of uniquely cultural matters. Critically examining history and education as components of culture, and therefore, of multiculturalism, the book makes some bold recommendations while demonstrating how nation-building is meaningless without the people's authentic history. It argues that Cameroon national culture cannot be a national culture without embodying the distinct culture of the English-speaking minority. Anything else is nothing but deliberate confusion of assimilation for multiculturalism, a confusion that is heavily tied to the country's phoney independence. Hinging on education (and its associates of bilingualism and bijuralism), the book demonstrates that Cameroon's over-sung cultural dualism is a charade, epitomized by the 1998 Education Law. Rather than reaffirm Cameroon's biculturalism as it superficially avows, Cameroon's purported cultural dualism is really out to efface any semblance of cultural or educational dualism that may still be resisting assimilation. The continuous and persistent employment of terms such as biculturalism, bilingualism and bijuralism in legal texts in Cameroon is only to confuse the international community, especially from seeing exactly the kind of 'ethnic cleansing' which is taking place in the country. |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* politics of multiculturalism
* education law of 1998

** ViEWS: A political violence early-warning system**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Håvard Hegre |
| **Author** | Marie Allansson |
| **Author** | Matthias Basedau |
| **Volume** | 56 |
| **Issue** | 2 |
| **Pages** | 002234331982386 |
| **Publication** | Journal of Peace Research |
| **ISSN** | 0022-3433, 1460-3578 |
| **Date** | 2019-02-15 |
| **DOI** | [10.1177/0022343319823860](http://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319823860) |
| **Accessed** | 2/22/2019, 5:17:21 AM |
| **Library Catalog** | Crossref |
| **Language** | en |
| **Abstract** | This article presents ViEWS-a political violence early-warning system that seeks to be maximally transparent, publicly available, and have uniform coverage, and sketches the methodological innovations required to achieve these objectives. ViEWS produces monthly forecasts at the country and subnational level for 36 months into the future and all three UCDP types of organized violence: state-based conflict, non-state conflict, and one-sided violence in Africa. The article presents the methodology and data behind these forecasts, evaluates their predictive performance, provides selected forecasts for October 2018 through October 2021, and indicates future extensions. ViEWS is built as an ensemble of constituent models designed to optimize its predictions. Each of these represents a theme that the conflict research literature suggests is relevant, or implements a specific statistical/machine-learning approach. Current forecasts indicate a persistence of conflict in regions in Africa with a recent history of political violence but also alert to new conflicts such as in Southern Cameroon and Northern Mozambique. The subsequent evaluation additionally shows that ViEWS is able to accurately capture the long-term behavior of established political violence, as well as diffusion processes such as the spread of violence in Cameroon. The performance demonstrated here indicates that ViEWS can be a useful complement to non-public conflict-warning systems, and also serves as a reference against which future improvements can be evaluated. |

** What’s Driving the Conflict in Cameroon?**

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| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Magazine Article |
| **Author** | Natalie Letsa |
| **URL** | <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/cameroon/2018-11-08/whats-driving-conflict-cameroon> |
| **Publication** | Foreign Affairs |
| **ISSN** | 0015-7120 |
| **Date** | 2018/11/08 |
| **Accessed** | 11/12/2018, 6:26:58 PM |
| **Library Catalog** | www.foreignaffairs.com |
| **Language** | en-US |
| **Abstract** | In recent months, political violence in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon has escalated dramatically. So far, at least 400 civilians and 160 state security officers have been killed in the conflict between the government and an armed separatist movement that, just two short years ago, started as a peaceful strike of lawyers and teachers. How did such upheaval come to a country that has prided itself for decades as a bulwark of stability in a region of violent conflict? And why has it escalated so quickly? |

**Tags:**

* Cameroon
* Strategy & Conflict

** When autocratic regimes are cheap and play dirty: the transaction costs of repression in South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | Journal Article |
| **Author** | Jens Rudbeck |
| **Author** | Erica Mukherjee |
| **Author** | Kelly Nelson |
| **Volume** | 48 |
| **Issue** | 2 |
| **Pages** | 147-166 |
| **Publication** | Comparative Politics |
| **Date** | 2016 |
| **Journal Abbr** | Comparative Politics |
| **Abstract** | Why do autocratic regimes use paramilitary groups, death squads, vigilantes, gangs, and other types of irregular, non-state actors to suppress popular opposition movements? We argue that the use of this type of state repression is a way for political leaders to lower the transaction costs of repression. Contrary to the use of regular security forces, which may trigger a host of consequences ranging from international economic sanctions to strikes and boycotts, irregular non-state violence specialists constitute an alternative governance structure for repression that, potentially, is less costly to elites. To substantiate this argument, the article investigates the use of informal violence to suppress opposition movements in South Africa, Kenya, and Egypt. It demonstrates how repression was shaped by the transaction costs that political leaders were confronting. |